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Abstract
This paper studies an economic contest with two participants, who
have overconﬁdence in their own relative abilities. We examine two
diﬀerent sources of overconﬁdence, overestimation of one’s own ability
and underestimation of the rival’s ability, and compare the behavioral
consequences of each situation with the correctly estimated case. The
main result is that the former always induces the participants’ aggres-
sive behavior, while the latter does not.
JEL classiﬁcation numbers: D44, D82.
Keywords: Overconﬁdence, economic contest, relative ability, all-pay
auction, distribution of abilities.
∗The author is grateful to Michihiro Kandori, Hajime Kobayashi, Akihiko Matsui,
Toshihiro Matsumura, Hitoshi Matsushima, Daisuke Oyama, Noriyuki Yanagawa, and
seminar participants at Contract Theory Workshop (CTW), Hosei University, Kyoto Game
Theory Workshop, Kyoto University and the University of Tokyo for their comments.
†Address: 2-2 Wakamatsu-cho, Shinjuku-ku Tokyo, 162-8677 Japan, TEL. +81-3-3341-
0748, FAX. +81-3-3341-0220, E-mail: m.ando@grips.ac.jp (M. Ando).
11 Introduction
Overconﬁdence is one of the famous stylized facts about human behavior.
Several studies in psychology and experimental economics show that humans
are overconﬁdent in their own (relative) abilities. For example, Svenson
(1981) reports that almost all drivers in Texas believe that their own driving
skills are above average. In addition, the literature usually indicates that
overconﬁdence induces people’s aggressive behavior. For example, Camerer
and Lovallo (1999) show that overconﬁdence brings about excess entry and
business failure by using an experimental approach.1
The aim of this paper is to study the behavioral consequences of par-
ticipants’ overconﬁdence in economic contests with two participants. In the
contests, each participant has overconﬁdence in his relative ability. There
are some possible situations where a participant has overconﬁdence in his
relative ability. Overconﬁdence in relative ability comes from overestimation
of one’s own ability and/or underestimation of the rival’s ability.
To simplify the exposition, we examine two extreme situations where
each participant has overestimation of his own ability or underestimation of
the rival’s ability, and compare the behavioral consequences of each situation
with the correctly estimated case. By this comparison, we will show that the
diﬀerent sources of overconﬁdence have diﬀerent behavioral consequences.
More precisely, we will show that in the former case overconﬁdence always
induces the participants’ aggressive behavior, while in the latter case it does
not.
In this paper, we study the following contest game. The principal hires
two risk neutral agents for a speciﬁc period of time and assigns a task for
each of them. Each agent outlays his eﬀort for winning. Diﬀerent agents
have diﬀerent types, which are equal to their monetary value of winning the
contest. We read agents’ types as their abilities since a higher ability agent
can obtain a higher return when he wins the contest. Examples of such a
situation are promotion contests in ﬁrms and political elections. The types
are independently and identically distributed. Each agent has his prior belief
about his own type and the distribution of types, and his beliefs may or may
not be correct. That is, he may have incorrect information about his type
or the distribution of types.2 Each agent chooses his eﬀort to maximize his
expected proﬁt. The eﬀort level of each agent is observable by all players
at the end when the agents already have chosen their eﬀort levels. For the
principal, larger eﬀorts are proﬁtable, so that she welcomes a larger expected
1See Camerer (1997) for further references.
2Under an auction setting called the all-pay auction under incomplete information,
we formulate the situation where a participant underestimates the rival’s ability by domi-
nance relations between the true distribution of types and the subjective belief about type
distribution. This means that the participant believes that there are many lower ability
types compared to the true distribution of types.
2eﬀort per agent.
Our results are as follows: First, we derive the symmetric Bayesian Nash
equilibrium strategy in the contest without overconﬁdence as the bench-
mark. Because of the fact that the contest game considered here is the
standard all-pay auction, we can identify the equilibrium eﬀort strategies
and derive the expected eﬀort level per agent by using the standard method
in auction literature. The equilibrium eﬀort levels are strictly increasing
with respect to types, so that the probability of winning in the contest is
equivalent to the probability that his type is no lower than the rival’s type.
Second, we show that overestimation of one’s own type always increases
agents’ eﬀorts, and therefore, it is proﬁt a b l ef o rt h ep r i n c i p a l . T h er e a s o n
why overestimation of one’s own type increases agents’ eﬀorts is as follows.
In the situation of overestimation of one’s own type, an agent behaves as if
he has a higher type. Since the equilibrium strategy is increasing in types,
he chooses a higher eﬀort compared to the benchmark case.
Third, we show that underestimation of the type distribution increases
eﬀorts of agents with low abilities, while it decreases eﬀorts of agents with
high abilities. Therefore, it may or may not be proﬁtable for the principal.
Additionally, we show that underestimation increases an agent’s expected
eﬀorts in some cases, while it decreases in other cases.
The fundamental reason why underestimation of the type distribution
changes agents’ eﬀorts is that underestimation changes each type’s subjec-
tive probability of winning. In underestimated situations, since the probabil-
ity of winning at the left tail increases faster compared to the benchmark case
(i.e., the correctly estimated case), underestimation induces more aggressive
eﬀorts at the left tail. For the higher types, underestimation decreases the
gradient of the probability of winning function. This reﬂects decreases in
the gradient of the eﬀort strategy function for the higher types.
There are two strands of theoretical works related to the present paper.
The ﬁrst class is analyses of economic contests as a variation of the all-pay
auction.3 Recently, the contest design problems from the viewpoint of the
contest designer have attracted much attention. Examples include Singh
and Wittman (1998, 2001), Moldovanu and Sela (2001), and Ando (2003).
However, these studies usually assume that the prior beliefs about one’s
own type and the type distribution are correct. Hence the present paper is
diﬀerent from these studies.
The second class is studies of overconﬁdence in the ﬁeld of behavioral
economics.4 Most studies of overconﬁdence focus on the situations of one
person’s decision making. For example, Dubra (2003) studies a search model
3Amann and Leininger (1996) and Krishna and Morgan (1997) are examples of theo-
retical studies on all-pay auctions. Noussair and Silver (2003) is an experimental study of
all-pay auctions under incomplete information.
4Camerer (2003) is a useful reference of the behavioral game theory. Itoh (2003) is a
study toward the behavioral contract theory.
3with an optimistic individual. In contrast to these studies, the present paper
studies an auction setting incorporated with overconﬁdence.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the envi-
ronment of our model. Section 3 examines the benchmark case, the behav-
ioral consequences of overestimation of one’s own type, and the behavioral
consequences of underestimation of the type distribution in turn. Section 4
concludes.
2M o d e l
We consider an economic contest with two risk neutral agents, agents 1 and
2. They compete to win the contest. Each agent i decides his eﬀort ei.
Eﬀorts are outlaid simultaneously and independently. The agents’ eﬀort
levels are observable by the principal and the agents at the end when the
agents have already chosen their eﬀort levels.
Each agent has a diﬀerent type, which represents his monetary value
o fw i n n i n g . T h et r u et y p eo fa g e n ti is denoted by θi and the exact value
may be perceptible when he wins. We assume that each agent has his prior
(or subjective) belief about his type, ai, and this is his private information.
T h et r u et y p eo fe a c ha g e n ti sd r a w nf r o ma ni n t e r v a l[ 0 ,1]a c c o r d i n gt o
the distribution function F that has a continuous and everywhere strictly
positive density function f.5
Note that, in the standard model of economic contests based on all-pay
auctions, each agent’s prior belief about his own type is exactly the same
as the true value and the distribution function is assumed to be common
knowledge for the principal and both agents. However, in this paper we relax
these assumptions. Agent i believes that his type is ai b u ti tm a yn o tb e
equal to the true type θi. Moreover, he believes that his type is drawn from
an interval [0,1] according to the distribution function Gi and the rival’s
type is also drawn independently according to the distribution function Gi
but Gi may not be equal to the true distribution F. Additionally, he believes
that the rival j’s prior belief about the type distribution is also Gi,t h er i v a l
knows his own true type (i.e., aj = θj), and these belief structures are
common knowledge.
In this contest, the real payoﬀ of agent i is, θi − ei if he wins, and −ei
if he does not. However each agent chooses his eﬀort in order to maximize
his expected payoﬀ based on his prior belief about his own type ai and the
knowledge about the type distribution Gi. For the principal, larger eﬀorts
are proﬁtable, so that she welcomes a larger expected eﬀort per agent.
5W ea s s u m et h a tt h et y p es p a c ei s[ 0 ,1]. This restriction is only for an analytical
convenience. We can preserve all our results in any non-negative types with bounded
support cases.
43 Analysis
3.1 The benchmark case
In this subsection, we consider the standard all-pay auction as the bench-
mark case. That is, we consider the situation where ai = θi and Gi = F,
i = 1,2.
The symmetric equilibrium eﬀort strategy in this contest game is as
follows.





and the symmetric equilibrium is unique.
Proof. The equilibrium strategy can be easily derived with the standard
method in auction litarature. The uniquness can be shown in the process of
derivation. Hence the proof is omitted.
In the symmetric equilibrium, since β(·) is strictly increasing, agent i’s
probability of winning (hereafter p(θi,F)) is equivalent to the probability
that his type is no lower than the rival’s type, that is, p(θi,F)=F(θi).





By using integration by parts with expressions (1) and (2), we obtain the
following.




(1 − F(θ))θf(θ)dθ. (3)
We provide an example.
Example 3.1. If F(θ)=θ, β(θ,F)=θ2/2 and E(e,F)=1/6.
3.2 Overestimation of one’s own type
In this subsection, we examine the consequences of overestimation of one’s
own type in economic contests. We assume that the prior knowledge about
the type distribution is correct (i.e., G1 = G2 = F). However, they have
incorrect information about their own types. We assume that they overes-
timate their types in a systematic way, for given θi ∈ [0,1), ai > θi, i = 1,2.
In this situation, each agent derives the equilibrium strategy β(·,F)b y
F. Then he chooses his action by calculation with β(·,F)a n dai.F r o mt h e
above facts, we obtain the following.
5Proposition 3. For an agent i with true type θi ∈ [0,1), overestimation of
his own type increases his eﬀort (i.e., β(ai,F) > β(θi,F) for all θi ∈ [0,1)
and for all ai > θi).
Proof. The eﬀort strategy β(·,F) is constructed by F, and thereofere, β(a,F)= R a





for all a>θ.T h u s ,w eo b t a i nβ(ai,F) > β(θi,F).
This proposition implies that, in the situations of overestimation of one’s
own type, an agent who has a true type θi b e h a v e sa si fh eh a sah i g h e r
type, ai. Since the equilibrium strategy is increasing in types, he chooses a
higher eﬀort compared to the benchmark case. Thus, overconﬁdence from
overestimation of one’s own type is always proﬁt a b l ef o rt h ep r i n c i p a l .
We provide an example. In this example, an agent with a true type θ ∈
(0,1) has an overestimation of his type that is constructed by the following
simple rule, a =
√
θ. This formulation permits us to directly calculate the
expected eﬀort level.
Example 3.2. Suppose that F(θ)=θ and ai =
√
θi. In this situation, the
eﬀort strategy is β(ai,F)=θi/2 and the expected eﬀort level per agent is
E(β(ai,F)) = 1/4. If the agent knows his true type, he follows the following
strategy β(θi,F)=θi
2/2 and the expected eﬀort level per agent is E(β(θi)) =
1/6.
The strategies in the above example are depicted in Figure 1.T h eh o r i -









63.3 Underestimation of the type distribution
In this subsection, we examine the consequences of underestimation of the
type distribution. We assume that each agent i knows his true type, that
is, ai = θi, i = 1,2. However, both agents have incorrect information about
the type distribution. We assume that, G1 = G2 = G 6= F.
The next proposition shows the eﬀort strategy under incorrect informa-
tion about the type distribution.
Proposition 4. If both agents have incorrect information about the type





Proof. The proof is omitted.





Note that this expected eﬀort is derived from the following facts. Each
type’s eﬀort level is calculated by β(·,G)a n dθi. However, the expectation
is based on the true distribution of types, F.
By using integration by parts with expressions (4) and (5), we obtain
the following.




(1 − F(θ))θg(θ)dθ. (6)
Now, we turn our attention to the characteristics of incorrect information
about the type distribution. We deﬁne the following.
Deﬁnition 1. For G 6= F, both agents underestimate the type distribution
if F ﬁrst order stochastically dominates G, that is,
∀θ ∈ [0,1],G(θ) ≥ F(θ).
An intuitive explanation of underestimation is that both agents believe
that there are many lower types compared to the true distribution of types.
Next, we describe how underestimation changes agents’ behavior.
Proposition 6. Compared with the benchmark case, underestimation of
type distribution changes agents’ behavior as follows. For G 6= F,
1.t h e r ee x i s t sˆ θ ∈ (0,1) such that, for all θ ∈ (ˆ θ,1], β(θ,G) < β(θ,F),
and
72. there exists an interval of types (θa,θb) such that for all θ ∈ (θa,θb),
β(θ,G) > β(θ,F).
Proof. The proof of the former statement is as follows. β(θ,G) − β(θ,F)= R θ
0 yg(y)dy −
R θ
0 yf(y)dy. By using integration by parts we obtain β(θ,G)−
β(θ,F)=θ(G(θ) − F(θ)) −
R θ
0 (G(y) − F(y))dy.T h i si ss t r i c t l yn e g a t i v ea t
θ = 1,s i n c eθ(G(θ)−F(θ)) is zero and
R θ
0 (G(y)−F(y))dy is strictly positive
at θ = 1 by deﬁnition. By the facts that β is increasing and continuous,
we can conclude that there exists ˆ θ ∈ (0,1)s u c ht h a t ,f o ra l lθ ∈ (ˆ θ,1],
β(θ,G) < β(θ,F).
The proof of the latter statement is as follows. We deﬁne θc =i n f {θ |
G(θ) >F (θ)}.F o r a n y θ ∈ [0,θc), β(θ,G)=β(θ,F), since for any θ ∈
[0,θc), g(θ)=f(θ), and β(θ,G)=
R θ
0 yg(y)dy and β(θ,F)=
R θ
0 yf(y)dy.F o r
suﬃciently small ε > 0, β(θc +ε,G)−β(θc +ε,F)=
R θc+ε
θc y(g(y)−f(y))dy
a n dt h i si ss t r i c t l yp o s i t i v e ,s i n c eg(θc + ε) >f (θc + ε)b yd e ﬁnition of θc.
By the facts that β is increasing and continuous, we can conclude that there
exists an interval of types (θa,θb) such that for all θ ∈ (θa,θb), β(θ,G) >
β(θ,F).
The implication of the above proposition is that, if both agents under-
estimate the type distribution, some types over work and other types under
work compared with the benchmark case. There is a possibility that the
sign of β(θ,G)−β(θ,F) changes more than once (that is, θb 6= ˆ θ). However,
to simplify the exposition, we restrict our attention to the situations where
β(θ,G)a n dβ(θ,F) are single-crossing in the interval (0,1) (that is, θa =0
and θb = ˆ θ) in the rest of this paper.
We can describe a suﬃcient condition for single-crossing of β(θ,G)a n d
β(θ,F).
Proposition 7. β(θ,G) and β(θ,F) are single-crossing in the interval (0,1],




0 y(g(y) −f(y))dy.T h i si sp o s i t i v ea tt h et y p e
just by zero, since g(y) >f(y)a ty =0 .M o r e o v e r ,g(y)a n df(y)a r ec r o s s i n g
only once at a certain y ∈ (0,1) and at the left hand side of there, g(y) >
f(y), and at the right hand side, g(y) <f(y). Since
R 1
0 (g(y) − f(y))dy =0
and y is strictly increasing function, we obtain
R 1
0 y(g(y) − f(y))dy < 0.
Next, we can show that ∃´ θ, ∀θ < ´ θ,∂β(θ,G)/∂θ > ∂β(θ,F)/∂θ and ∀θ >
´ θ,∂β(θ,G)/∂θ < ∂β(θ,F)/∂θ,s i n c e∂β(θ,G)/∂θ = θg(θ)a n d∂β(θ,F)/∂θ =
θf(θ).
From the above facts and the facts that β is increasing and continuous,
we can conclude that β(θ,G)a n dβ(θ,F) are single-crossing in the interval
(0,1).
8This proposition tells us that, if the density functions are single-crossing,
β(θ,G)a n dβ(θ,F) are also single-crossing in the interval (0,1).
We brieﬂy describe the reason why underestimation of the type distri-
bution changes agents’ eﬀorts under single-crossing situations. When an
agent with true type θ underestimates the type distribution, his subjective
probability of winning in the contest is changed from F(θ)t oG(θ). In this
underestimated situation, since the probability of winning at the left tail
increases faster compared to the benchmark case, underestimation induces
more aggressive eﬀort at the left tail. For the higher types, underestimation
decreases the gradient of the probability of winning function. This reﬂects
decreases in the gradient of the eﬀort strategy function for the higher types.
We provide an example.
Example 3.3. Suppose that ai = θi,i = 1,2,a n dF(θ)=θ and G(θ)=
2θ − θi
2.I nt h i ss i t u a t i o n ,β(θ,F)=θ2/2 and β(θ,G)=θ2 − 2θ3/3.
T h ea b o v ee x a m p l ei sd e p i c t e di nF i g u r e2 . T h eh o r i z o n t a la x i si st h e









Finally, we describe changes in the expected eﬀort brought by underesti-
mation of type distribution. In the following proposition, we show that the
necessary and suﬃcient condition for E(e,G) >E (e,F). If the condition
holds, the expected value of increases in the lower types’ eﬀorts is larger
than that of decreases in the higher types’ eﬀorts, so that underestimation
increases the agents’ expected eﬀorts. Consequently, the underestimation
is proﬁtable for the principal. Otherwise, underestimation decreases the
agents’ expected eﬀorts and is not proﬁtable for the principal.
9Proposition 8. E(e,G) >E (e,F) if and only if
R 1
0 (1 − F(θ))θ(g(θ) −
f(θ))dθ.
Proof. This statement is straightforward from Propositions 2 and 5.
We provide two examples. The former shows that underestimation may
increase the agents’ expected eﬀorts and the latter shows that underestima-
tion may decreases the agents’ expected eﬀorts.
Example 3.4. Suppose that ai = θi,i= 1,2,a n dF(θ)=θ.I nt h ec o r r e c t l y
estimated case, E(e,F)=1/6.
• If G(θ)=( 3 θ − θ3)/2, E(e,G)=7 /40.
• If G(θ)=3 θ − 2θ3/2, E(e,G)=11/70.
4 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have examined two diﬀerent sources of overconﬁdence
and have compared the behavioral consequences of each situation with the
benchmark case. The main result is that overestimation of one’s own ability
always induces participants’ aggressive behavior, while underestimation of
the rival’s ability does not. To conclude the paper, three remarks are in
order.
F i r s t ,f o ra na g e n t ,b o t ho v e r e s t i m a t i o no fh i so w nt y p ea n du n d e r e s t i -
mation of the type distribution increase his subjective probability of winning
in the contest. For example, consider an agent with true type 1/2i nt h e
situation where F(θ)=θ. In this situation, his true probability of winning is
1/2. However, in the situation of overestimation of his own type as ai =
√
θi,
his subjective probability of winning is
p
1/2 that is strictly larger than the
true value, 1/2. In the situation where he underestimates the type distribu-
tion as G(θ)=2 θ − θ2, his subjective probability of winning is 3/4t h a ti s
also strictly larger than the true value, 1/2. In both situations, he has an
overestimation about the probability of winning in the contest. However,
these two situations may yield diﬀerent consequences. The former is always
proﬁtable for the principal but the latter may not be.
Second, experiments of economic contests under the situation where par-
ticipants have overconﬁdence may be interesting topics. However, they in-
v o l v es o m ed i ﬃculties. In the all-pay auction experiments without overcon-
ﬁdence, Noussair and Silver (2003) observed over-bidding behavior of the
subjects.6 So, if we observe over-bidding (or under-bidding) in experiments
6Dorsey and Razzolini (2002) attempted to describe the source of over-bidding behavior
of bidders in ﬁrst-price auctions by auction experiments and compared the choices under
a ﬁrst-price auction and incentive-wise identical lottery. They concluded that the subjects
cannot calculate the probability of winning in auctions appropriately, so that over-bidding
occurs.
10with overconﬁdence, we cannot conclude immediately that overconﬁdence
yields over-bidding (or under-bidding). Consequently, we should design ex-
periments carefully to reach a conclusion.
Third, we have showed that the diﬀerent sources of overconﬁdence have
diﬀerent behavioral consequences. This type of conclusion is not only in
situations of contests or auctions. Consider Bertrand competition in diﬀer-
entiated duopoly. Since strategic complementarities exist, lower marginal
costs of one’s own ﬁrm (i.e., higher one’s own relative abilities) yield his
aggressive behavior and higher marginal costs of the rival ﬁrm (i.e., lower
the rival’s relative abilities) yield his less aggressive behavior.
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